Islamization of Europe and Policies to Prevent It, Part 11
12 May, 2009
Policy Area 5.1: National identity and culture
5.1. DEFINITION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF MuslimS IN EUROPE
The issues of what a national identity is, and what contents a specific national culture has, are of basic importance. They directly regard what Europeans want to preserve and must defend against attacks. In country after country conquered by islam, the original culture is systematically destroyed, and an arabization carried out. The domestic culture is seen more or less as worthless by the immigrants or converts and is replaced by an arab desert culture from the 7th century, alien to the country.
The annihilation of the Buddha statues in Afganistan is just one dramatic example of what goes on in tens of thousands of locations in various countries. Nearly everything that reminds people of the time before being conquered by islam is looked upon as worthless which should be destroyed. One recent example regards Pakistan, where the Muslim Indian culture still strong after the breakup of old India and its replacement with two states (later three), has steadily retreated during the last decades and been replaced by the invading arab culture.
These attacks on national identities and national cultures in Europe by Muslim immigrants take many forms, and Muslims naturally differ regarding their individual willingness and eagerness to carry out such attacks. Before we treat the issues of identity and culture, we shall define whom the most important Muslim enemies to our cultures and important national values in Europe are. The earlier parts of this series have underlined that the basic, main enemy to Europe and the Western civilization is - the traditional islamic doctrine. The people who believe in it, are then our enemies. The question then is what Muslims in Europe believe regarding the doctrine.
Discussions regarding who is a moderate Muslim (supposed then to more or less sympathize with our values) and who is a radical Muslim (enemy to our values) are often confused. The reason is probably that the participants use the term “moderate” without defining it properly. The term is often used to indicate conformity with Western political concepts and values. That is not very useful because most Muslims can then not be categorized as moderates but as radicals (even if they are nonviolent). The fact is that such nonviolent persons are willing to destroy important human rights in the name of islam but are not willing to fight for it militarily - just now. If we use Wafa Sultan's definition of a moderate Muslim (1), such a person:
...fully supports separation of state and religion, rejects implementation of Sharia law and believes that it has no binding with Western codes of human-rights. A moderate Muslim is one who respects and supports our western system of liberal democracy; including equal rights of all religions, races and gender.
Last and not least, moderate Muslims ought to be courageous and honest enough to condemn crimes done in the name of Islam and admit that these crimes are all committed with the implicit approval of traditional Islamic theology.
This definition leads to the inevitable conclusion that just a small part of the Muslims in Europe are moderates while the rest are radicals. While that is a fact, it does not illuminate the heterogeneity of the ummah in Europe and doesn't gives us any good tools to analyse the situation in a specific country, or region, in detail. Neither does it help us to formulate policies regarding the large existing immigrant population. However, a simple demand for true acceptance of UDHR by new immigrants can of course be a cornerstone in a policy regarding immigration (see Part 10, Policy Area 8: Rules for Visas, Immigration and Citizenship). For our purpose here, however, we search for a more precise and therefore more complex tool. It may therefore be helpful to disregard o u r definition of “moderation” and instead use the islamic one and define categories of Muslims mainly on that basis. It gives us better indications regarding our task to formulate policies regarding culture, integration, immigration and security for the western countries.
The following categories (based on general conformity with the moslem faith) seem relevant in Europe. Regarding pp. 1 and 5–10 below, their order is based on an increasing agreement with the traditional interpretation of the islamic doctrine:
1. Muslim apostates
2. Atheists, agnostics and people with similar views of religion.
3. Believers in polytheistic religions
4. Believers in the other monotheistic religions: the Jewish faith, Christianity
5. Mainly in the West: Reform interpretations of the Muslim faith (various groups)
6. In the West: Secular Muslims and Arab nationalists (secular)
7. In the West: “Cultural” Muslims
8. Globally: National or regional interpretations of the Muslim doctrine. There are national variants of the different legal schools, which then show characteristics special for the nation or region. These characteristics have often softened various harsh parts of the religion.
9. The traditional interpretation of the Muslim faith which is also real islam. Believers belonging to this group are called “moderate” Muslims here, and they belong to the accepted traditional schools. The following subgroups among moderates seem relevant:
- Moderates (using nonviolent means to carry out jihad)
- Moderates (using violent means to carry out jihad)
- Moderates not willing to carry out any form of jihad is a contradiction (see comment below)
10. Extremist interpretations of the Muslim faith
COMMENTS REGARDING VARIOUS CATEGORIES
Category 1: An apostate basically uses one of the belief systems 2-4. The islamic doctrine has always been totally clear that death is the only penalty possible for apostates.
People within categories 2 - 4 can have very different views of human rights and views of islam. Some atheists are socialists or communists and are practically allies to the islamists, while other atheists are libertarians with an extremely high regard of human rights and are perhaps the strongest adversaries to islam. Many Christian churches have so far shown very little sense of self-preservation, concern for coming generations of Europeans, or concern for their brothers in faith in Muslim countries who are persecuted by Muslims. This is probably a consequence of the recruitment of many persons as priests who politically are socialists. Some church leaders ( e g in England) seem to welcome Muslims in order to cause a situation where they become more relevant for their own people. It means that they put their own country in danger just in order to temporarily strengthen their own church. They don't understand the position their church and Christians generally in the country will be in with a large Muslim minority, or Muslims as a political majority.
Category 5 (reform-minded Muslims) are people who look at themselves as Muslims but want—mainly for reasons of human rights—to change many parts of the accepted doctrine. But traditional Muslims generally regard them as apostates owing to their proposals to change the doctrine.
Secular Muslims (cat. 6) don't believe in islam and don't follow the five pillars of islam. However, owing to the threat against apostates and their wish to continue to be part of the Muslim society or maintain family ties, they don't publicly declare or show their lack of interest in islam. Arab nationalists—the second part of this category—are of special interest. They are nominal Muslims but secular who don't take the religion seriously. They may basically be fascists, socialists etc. However, they understand—like many secular Muslims—the basic function of the Muslim faith as a tool to conquer other nations and their riches. Even if they don't believe a word of what the mullahs or islamists say, they know that if the Muslims will get into power in a western country, they will give preferential treatment to the Muslims and then specially the leading part of the Muslims—the arabs. If Muslims later will get complete political power, they can really apply discriminatory laws and take over the property of the nonMuslims (as always happened earlier in history). So islam can still be used as a tool for enrichment, like socialism was/is a tool for many poor people to force better-off people to share their wealth (even if these poor persons don't believe a word of the socialistic ideology).
It means that many nonreligious Muslims will support the traditional Muslims when those start to compete regarding political power in a western society. The western notion that secular Muslims automatically are our allies is wrong. While many secular Muslims may be sympathetic to some western political institutions and habits, the weight of the culture and the temptation of future monetary gains will make many of them back radical political Muslim movements anyway. Many also like the preferential position islam gives men. Having a wife submissive and obedient like a slave regarding most matters and therefore also having complete service regarding home and sex, is something many Muslim males will not give up. Nowadays only the gender apartheid of islam guarantees such superiority and dominance of males over females. This is a very basic reason for Muslim males to support islam. It is a critical part of islam and Muslim culture. However, secular Muslim women understand well their own mistreatment by men and this is more important for them than the possibility to exploit nonMuslims in the future (or even the culture). The integration of the women in this category is probably successful in most countries.
Cat. 7 (cultural Muslims) differs from 6 because these Muslims believe Allah exists and Muhammed is his prophet, but they worship him in a personal way. They cherry-pick the parts of the religion they choose to believe in and by doing so break the rule in the doctrine forbidding Muslims to pick some parts which they obey and disregard others. Cultural Muslims in the West have some respect for western human rights and political institutions but it is unclear how deep it is. It is very probable that most of them would support hardcore islamists in case of a showdown.
Cat. 8 (national interpretations of the Muslim doctrine) resembles cat. 7 to a certain degree but the believers are generally much closer to the traditional, real form of islam. In some places in India, South East Asia etc Muslims historically tried to combine their traditional way of life and the Muslim religion, and as a consequence they have disregarded certain parts of the doctrine e g jihad. They are therefore now more tolerant and peaceful than other Muslims. However, the wahhabist movement backed by the Saudi government has now with the backing of oil-money for some decades taken over many mosques etc. Orthodox islam has been strengthened in numerous ways in many of these countries. The national, more tolerant interpretations of islam are therefore retreating continuously. Some may in practice become extinct in the future. However, immigrants from these countries look at themselves as true Muslims, and a majority will certainly not support nonMuslims in a fight against fundamental islam.
WHO IS A MODERATE Muslim (CATEGORY 9)?
Jihad is sometimes called the 6th pillar of islam. Here we don't talk about spiritual jihad (to work with oneself in order to become a better person). Only 3 percent of the examples where jihad is mentioned in the quran and the most basic texts of islam, refers to this spiritual jihad. Ninety-seven (97) percent of the cases refer to violent jihad which shows the importance Allah/Muhammed attached to this type of jihad. The reason spiritual jihad has gotten so much attention is pure taqiyya and the islamists' success in lying about jihad to western politicians and the public in West.
For some reason, jihad was not formally included among the basic religious demands on Muslims. However, it is still a fundamental and definite obligation for every male Muslim to take part in jihad when such a war has been proclaimed in a legal way. The obligation is so definite that it has been characterized as the 6th pillar of islam. But Muslims can have different points-of-view what to do when no accepted caliphate exists. Then the legality of a proclamation of violent jihad can be in doubt. Is it a continuous individual duty, or a collective duty limited to a certain period of time ? Who can start a jihad ? What justifications are legally necessary etc?
Using this 6th pillar of islam for defining subcategories of Muslims illuminates an important fact regarding traditional Muslims. All traditional Muslims want to live in a society governed by Muslims and sharia law and will then treat
infidels according to sharia law. In our discussion regarding Policy Area 6 (The Policy Of Assimilation or Integration) we pointed out in the sect. “Which Religion and Culture?” the similarity between moderate and terrorist
interpretations of the quran. We then used the word “extremist” from a western point-of-view regarding those who carry out violent jihad activities. Here, however, we define the categories from a Muslim point-of-view. The main criterion is the willingness to use violence at the current time. Because of the doctrine, persons who carry out violent jihad activities can also be labelled moderates. Muhammed talked about “the middle path” which is the correct path and a path of religious moderation, and the people following it are the moderates. Violent jihad and spreading islam by the sword is therefore often definitely sunnah. People diverging from that path are, from an islamic point-of-view, extremists or worse. People who try to reform islam are apostates. Cultural Muslims (cat.7) who probably have accepted at least some parts of the behavior and viewpoints of their host countries may be extremists (if they are not labelled apostates and infidels). Cherry-picking parts of the islamic doctrine is definitely not allowed.
Owing to the military superiority of the western countries, military jihad is of limited usefulness for the ummah for the time being. Nonviolent jihad - not peaceful but using nonviolent means – is therefore the great threat against the West. Muslims have a duty to further and promote islam, and moderates in category 9A fulfills this obligation through a large number of activities in Europe. One part of nonviolent jihad is demographic jihad, i.e. creating so many children that Muslims may become political majorities in many western countries. Another one is legal jihad – using the legal system to win advantages for the islamist cause. Making the western society conform to sharia in many respects is another important part of nonviolent jihad. Marrying western women and creating Muslim children with them is another favourite method of nonviolent jihad for younger men.
Cat. 9A-Muslims don't accept the necessity to take part in violent jihad at the current time, and some may even object to political violence for many reasons. But they have the same ultimate goals as the 9B-Muslims and only differ regarding methods. Their cooperation in peaceful times with the 9B-Muslims resembles the classical “Good cop-Bad Cop” routine. And they would never object in a way that supports the nonMuslims. Even when they are asked to take a stand e g against terrorism, they are passive, or they formulate their objections using such formulations that those are really not an objection to the jihad activities. Western ignorance of islamic terminology and doctrine makes such exercises easy for Muslims.
Such behaviour is highly important because it shows what will happen in the future. The phrase : “If you are not with me, you are against me” is highly relevant in this case. Muhammed used silence as a sign of approval or acceptance regarding another matter (a girl's acceptance to be married to a certain person). The same principle of interpretation is valid here. And one finds the same rule in many cultures. In e g Scandinavia there is a proverb saying: “The person who remains silent, agrees”. The silence of cat. 9A-Muslims is therefore a clear a sign of—if not always approval—anyway acceptance of the jihad activities carried out by cat. 9B-Muslims. The more numerous and stronger the Muslims are in a society, the stronger will the support by the nonviolent moderates (cat. 9A) be for the violent Muslims (cat. 9B). If the cat. 9B-Muslims in a specific country start jihad there, they can expect to be supported by most of the 9A-Muslims. The character and level of support depends on the quality of the religious argumentation by the jihadists.
If there will be a caliphate in the future which is generally accepted by Muslims all over the world, we can expect most cat. 9A-Muslims to take part in violent jihad against their host countries when the caliph proclaims such a state of war. A majority of the members of cat.7-8 will, of course, then also take part in such a jihad. That is natural given the fundamental importance of violent/physical jihad in the doctrine.
The cat. 9C is evidently not relevant. If such Muslims don't want to do anything to promote traditional islam, they are not following the quran or sunnah, and should not be classified as traditional believers.
Cat. 10 regards those Muslims who try to follow and realize the full traditional doctrine but do it in a way that violates the middle path. The persons who maintain that a specific so-called terrorist is a Muslim extremist, have the responsibility to show exactly how that terrorist has broken Allah's/Muhammed's rules of behaviour. If they try, they will probably often find that the terrorist is a moderate Muslim (cat. 9B).
A GENERAL CONCLUSION
The categories above can be useful for formulating policies towards various segments of the Muslim immigrant population. The conclusions regarding the term “moderate Muslim” are highly important for all policymaking.
There seems to be no movement towards successful integration
regarding the majority of members in any of the larger groups (cat.
7- 9) in any European country. Secular moslems (part of cat. 6)
naturally offer the best chances and then specially female members.
The lack of success makes it mandatory now to pursue much more
forceful policies regarding integration. Specially women, young
people and children belonging to all categories are then prime
targets for an active policy to substitute the culture of the host
country for those parts of the Muslim culture which violate human
rights. To be able to do that one must know which parts of the
culture and which values of the European country that ought to be
promoted constantly and aggressively.
1. Jamie Glazov, Symposium: Anti-Fascists of Islam, FrontPageMagazine.com, March 14, 2008